Abstract. We demonstrate how access control models and policies can be represented by using term rewriting systems, and how rewriting may be used for evaluating access requests and for proving properties of an access control policy. We focus on two kinds of access control models: discretionary models, based on access control lists (ACLs), and rolebased access control (RBAC) models. For RBAC models, we show that we can specify several variants, including models with role hierarchies, and constraints and support for security administrator review querying.
Introduction
Access control has long been recognised as being of fundamental importance in computer security. In early work on access control models, Lampson [27] described the use of a matrix for describing the access privileges that users may exercise on system resources. Variations of the access matrix, typically Access Control Lists (ACLs), are still very much in use today (see, for example, [16] ). In recent years, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [32, 9] has emerged as the principal form of access control model in theory and practice.
For all types of access control models, from the access matrix to RBAC, researchers have recognised the importance of applying formal techniques to define access control models, access policies and the operational methods used for access request evaluation. Formal specification makes it possible to, for instance, compare policies rigorously, to understand the consequences of modifying policies, and to prove properties of policies.
In this paper, we demonstrate how term rewriting [15, 24, 5] may be profitably used in the formalisation of ACL and RBAC models and policies, and we demonstrate the use of rewriting for access request evaluation with respect to policies that are defined in terms of these models.
Term rewriting systems are usually defined by specifying a set of terms, and a set of rewrite rules that are used to "reduce" terms. This simple idea is very powerful: term rewriting techniques have been successfully applied to many domains in the last 20 years. They have had deep influence in the development of computational models, programming and specification languages, theorem provers and proof assistants. More recently, rewriting techniques have been fruitfully exploited in the context of security protocols (see, for instance, [10] ) and security policies for controlling information leakage (see, for example, [17] ).
The access matrix [27] itself includes a row for each subject, and a column for each object in the system. Each cell of the matrix describes the set of access privileges that a subject may exercise on an object. An access matrix is usually implemented as an ACL, which records for each subject the privileges on objects that are assigned to the subject. A reference monitor is used to evaluate requests by subjects to exercise access privileges on an object. A user u ∈ U is authorised to exercise an access privilege p ∈ P on an object o ∈ O if and only if the access matrix/access control list includes an entry that specifies that u is assigned the p privilege on o.
Role-based Access Control
In very simple terms, the fundamental idea of RBAC is that:
-a user u of a resource o may be assigned to a set of roles {r 1 , . . . , r n } (usually as a consequence of the user performing a job function in an organisation e.g., doctor, CEO, etc); -access privileges on resources are also assigned to roles; -a user u may exercise an access privilege p on a resource o if and only if u is assigned to a role r to which the privilege p on o is also assigned.
It follows, from the discussion above, that RBAC models/policies are specified with respect to a domain of discourse that includes the sets U of users, O of objects, and P of access privileges, together with a (finite) set R of roles.
The capability of assigning users to roles and permissions (i.e., access privilege assignments on objects) to roles are primitive requirements of all RBAC models. The most basic category of RBAC model, flat RBAC [32] (or RBAC F for short), requires that these types of assignment are supported. The RBAC H2A model extends RBAC F to include the notion of an RBAC role hierarchy (see below) in addition to user-role and permission-role assignments. The RBAC C3A model extends RBAC H2A by allowing constraints on policies to be represented, and the RBAC S4A model extends RBAC C3A by allowing administrator queries to be evaluated with respect to an RBAC policy specification. The flat RBAC, RBAC H2A , RBAC C3A and RBAC S4A models from [32] are referred to, respectively, as RBAC F , RBAC P H2A , RBAC P C3A and RBAC P S4A logic theories in the formal representation of RBAC models in [9] . In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to RBAC F , RBAC P H2A , RBAC P C3A and RBAC P S4A theories rather than models.
In the RBAC P H2A theory, the semantics of user-role assignment may be defined in terms of a 2-place ura predicate (where ura is short for "user role assignment") and permission-role assignment can be defined in terms of a 3-place predicate pra (where pra is short for "permission role assignment"). The extensions of these predicates define role and permission assignments in a world of interest. Definition 1. Let Π be an RBAC P H2A theory. Then, -Π |= ura(u, r) if and only if user u ∈ U is assigned to role r ∈ R; -Π |= pra(a, o, r) if and only if the access privilege a ∈ A on object o ∈ O is assigned to the role r ∈ R.
An RBAC P H2A role hierarchy is defined as a (partially) ordered (and finite) set of roles. The ordering relation is a role seniority relation. In an RBAC P H2A theory Π, a 2-place predicate senior to(r i , r j ) is used to define the seniority ordering between pairs of roles i.e., the role r i ∈ R is a more senior role (or more powerful role) than role r j ∈ R. If r i is senior to r j then any user assigned to the role r i has at least the permissions that users assigned to role r j have. Role hierarchies are important for specifying implicitly the inheritance of access privileges on resources.
The semantics of the senior to relation may be expressed, in terms of an RBAC P H2A theory Π, thus:
-Π |= senior to(r i , r j ) if and only if the role r i ∈ R is senior to the role r j ∈ R in an RBAC P H2A role hierarchy.
The senior to relation may be defined as the reflexive-transitive closure of an irreflexive-intransitive binary relation ds (where ds is short for "directly senior to"). The semantics of ds may be expressed, in terms of an RBAC P H2A theory Π, thus:
-Π |= ds(r i , r j ) iff r i = r j , the role r i ∈ R is senior to the role r j ∈ R in an RBAC P H2A role hierarchy defined in Π, and there is no role r k ∈ R such that [ds(r k , r j ) ∧ ds(r i , r k )] holds where r k = r i and r k = r j . Remark 1. In RBAC, users activate and deactivate roles in the course of session management. Session management is an implementation issue, the details of which will be the subject of future work. Example 1. Suppose that the users u 1 and u 2 are assigned to the roles r 2 and r 1 respectively, and that write (w) permission on object o 1 is assigned to r 1 and read (r) permission on o 1 is assigned to r 2 . Moreover, suppose that r 1 is directly senior to r 2 in an RBAC P H2A role hierarchy. Then, using the notation introduced above, this RBAC H2A policy is represented by the relations:
User-role and permission-role assignments are related via the notion of an authorisation. An authorisation is a triple (u, a, o) that expresses that the user u has the a access privilege on the object o. Given an RBAC P H2A theory Π, the set of authorisations AU T H defined by Π may be expressed thus:
According to the definition of the set AU T H above, a user u may exercise the a access privilege on object o if:
u is assigned to the role r 1 , 1 r 1 is senior to a role r 2 in an RBAC P H2A
role hierarchy, and r 2 has been assigned the a access privilege on o.
Example 2. By inspection of the user-role assignments, permission-role assignments, and the role seniority relationships that are specified in Example 1, it follows that the set of authorisations that are included in AU T H is:
To extend RBAC H2A theories to RBAC C3A theories, separation of duties constraints must be supported. The static separation of duties (ssd) constraint is used to specify that a user cannot be assigned to a pair of mutually exclusive roles [9] . The dynamic separation of duties (dsd) constraint is used to prevent a user simultaneously activating a pair of roles that are specified as being dynamically separated [9] .
To extend RBAC C3A programs to RBAC S4A theories, permission-role review must be possible in addition to user-role reviews, the latter being a requirement of RBAC F theories (see [32, 9] ). That is, it must be possible for security administrators to pose queries on RBAC policy specifications to determine (i) the set of roles a user is assigned to, and (ii) the permissions that are assigned to roles.
Term Rewriting
Term rewriting systems can be seen as programming or specification languages, or as formulae manipulating systems that can be used in various applications such as operational-semantics specification, program optimisation or automated theorem proving. We recall briefly the definition of first-order terms and term rewriting systems, and refer the reader to [5] for further details and examples.
A signature F is a finite set of function symbols together with their (fixed) arity. X denotes a denumerable set of variables, and T (F, X ) denotes the set of terms built up from F and X .
Terms are identified with finite labeled trees, as usual. The symbol at the root of t is denoted by root(t). Positions are strings of positive integers. The subterm of t at position p is denoted by t| p and the result of replacing t| p with u at position p in t is denoted by t[u] p . V(t) denotes the set of variables occurring in t. A term is linear if variables in V(t) occur at most once in t. A term is ground if V(t) = ∅. Substitutions are written as in {x 1 → t 1 , . . . , x n → t n } where t i is assumed different from x i . We use Greek letters for substitutions and postfix notation for their application.
Definition 2. Given a signature F, a term rewriting system on F is a set of rewrite rules R = {l i → r i } i∈I , where l i , r i ∈ T (F, X ), l i ∈ X , and V(r i ) ⊆ V(l i ). A term t rewrites to a term u at position p with the rule l → r and the substitution σ, written t → l→r p u, or simply t → R u, if t| p = lσ and u = t[rσ] p . Such a term t is called reducible. Irreducible terms are said to be in normal form.
We denote by → + R (resp. → * R ) the transitive (resp. transitive and reflexive) closure of the rewrite relation → R . The subindex R will be omitted when it is clear from the context. -Z (with arity 0) and S (with arity 1, denoting the successor function) to build numbers; -nil (with arity 0, to denote an empty list), cons (with arity 2, to construct non-empty lists), and append(also with arity 2, to represent the operation that concatenates two lists).
We can specify list concatenation with the following rewrite rules:
Then we have a reduction sequence:
Let l → r and s → t be two rewrite rules (we assume that the variables of s → t were renamed so that there is no common variable with l → r), p the position of a non-variable subterm of s, and µ a most general unifier of s| p and l. Then (tµ, sµ[rµ] p ) is a critical pair formed from those rules. Note that s → t may be a renamed version of l → r. In this case a superposition at the root position is not considered a critical pair.
A term rewriting system R is:
-confluent if for all terms t, u, v: t → * u and t → * v implies u → * s and v → * s, for some s; -terminating (or strongly normalising) if all reduction sequences are finite; -left-linear if all left-hand sides of rules in R are linear; -non-overlapping if there are no critical pairs; -orthogonal if it is left-linear and non-overlapping; -non-duplicating if for all l → r ∈ R and x ∈ V(l), the number of occurrences of x in r is less than or equal to the number of occurrences of x in l.
For example, the rewrite system in Example 3 is confluent, terminating, leftlinear and non-overlapping (therefore orthogonal), and non-duplicating.
A hierarchical union of rewrite systems consists of a set of rules defining some basic functions (this is called the basis of the hierarchy) and a series of enrichments. Each enrichment defines a new function or functions, using the ones previously defined. Constructors may be shared between the basis and the enrichments.
We recall a modularity result for termination of hierarchical unions from [19] (Theorem 14), which will be useful later:
If in a hierarchical union the basis is non-duplicating and terminating, and each enrichment satisfies a general scheme of recursion, where each recursive call in the right-hand side of a rule uses subterms of the left-hand side, then the hierarchical union is terminating.
In this section, we illustrate the use of rewriting systems to specify ACL policies with an example. We do not claim that this is the only way to formalise an ACL policy as a rewrite system. Instead, our goal is to give an executable 2 specification of an ACL policy, to show some basic properties, and to address, using rewriting techniques, the problem of checking that the specification is consistent, correct, and complete (that is, no access can be both granted and denied, no unauthorised access is granted and no authorised access is denied).
Rewrite Rules
Consider a set of objects, and a set of user-identifiers: U = {u 1 , . . . , u n }, such that each user has a certain number of access privileges on those objects. For simplicity, assume that user identifiers are natural numbers, and to make the example more concrete, assume that the objects are files and the access privileges are read (r), write (w) or execute (x). For simplicity, we will only consider one file (the generalisation to many files is straightforward). The policy that we will model specifies that a user with an even identifier has rw rights (i.e., can read and write on the file), whereas users with odd numbers can only read, and users whose identifier is a multiple of 4 can read, write and also execute the file.
Users will request access to the file by using the function access, which will grant or deny the access depending on the user and the operation requested. Requests will be expressed as access(u, req) where u is a user-identifier and req is either r, w or x. The request will be evaluated using the rewrite system R ACL given below; the result will be either grant or deny.
In the rewrite rules below, we denote variables with capital letters (e.g., U is a variable), and function symbols (including constants) with lower-case letters (e.g. r, w, x are constants). We use rem(n, m) to compute the remainder of the division of n by m.
For example, with these rewrite rules a request from user 101 to write on the file is denied, whereas a request from user 20 to execute it is granted, since:
R ACL provides an executable specification of the policy (the rewrite rules are both a specification and an implementation of the access control function).
Properties of the Policy
In order for an access policy to be "acceptable", it is necessary that the policy satisfies certain acceptability criteria. As an informal example, it may be necessary to ensure that an access policy formulation does not specify that any user is granted and denied the same access privilege on the same data item (i.e., that the policy is consistent).
The following properties of R ACL are easy to check, and will be used to prove that the policy specified is consistent, correct, and complete. Property 1. The rewrite system R ACL is terminating and confluent.
Proof. Termination is trivially obtained, since R ACL is a first-order system, and there are no recursive or mutually recursive functions. To prove confluence, first note that there are no critical pairs, therefore the system is locally confluent. Termination and local confluence imply confluence, by Newman's Lemma [30] . Corollary 1. Every term has a unique normal form in R ACL .
As a consequence of the unicity of normal forms, our specification of the access control policy is consistent. Property 2 (Consistency). For any user u and request req, it is not possible to derive both grant and deny for a request access(u, req).
We can give a characterisation of the normal forms: Property 3. The normal form of a ground term of the form access(u, req) where u is a number and req ∈ {r, w, x} is either grant or deny.
As a consequence, our specification of the access control policy is total, in the sense that any valid request (i.e., a request from a valid user to perform a valid operation on an existing object) produces a result (a denial or an acceptance).
Property 4 (Totality).
Each access request access(u, req) from a valid user u to perform a valid operation req is either denied or granted. This is shown by inspection of the rewrite rules.
RBAC Policy Specifications as Rewrite Systems
In this section, we specify RBAC policies in terms of a rewrite system that is confluent and terminating. The normal forms of access requests are grant/deny i.e., each access request is reducible to grant or deny but not both.
Rewrite Rules
As indicated in Section 2, RBAC policies are specified with respect to: a set U of users, a set O of objects, a set A of access privileges, and a set R of roles.
We will use the function roles : U → List(R) to represent the assignment of roles to users (note that a user may be assigned to several roles). Lists will be built from constructors nil and cons (see Example 3), and we will write [e 1 , . . . , e n ] as an abbreviation for the list constructed from the elements e 1 , . . . , e n . It is worth noting that a predicate ura, as discussed in Section 2, can also be specified with rewrite rules, since predicates are boolean functions (in this case we could define a function from pairs (u, r) ∈ (U × R) to booleans True, False). However, we prefer to model ura as a function from users to lists of roles because of the additional advantages this provides. In particular, modelling ura as a function makes it easy to obtain all of the roles that a specific user is assigned to. This is an essential requirement of RBAC F theories, which emphasise the importance of performing administrative checks of user-role assignments from an RBAC policy specification. The following rewrite rules specify a function roles, where we assume U = {u 1 , . . . , u n } and each r ij ∈ R.
. . .
To represent the assignment of privileges to roles (called pra in Section 2), we have again two design choices: we could use a boolean function (i.e., , a predicate) with three arguments (role, access privilege, object) or we can use a function priv from roles to lists of pairs (a, o)
The second approach has advantages from a security administrator's point of view, since a function priv, to compute the set of access privileges assigned to a role, can be used to perform checks on the access policy specification (as required for RBAC P S4A policies). We define priv by the following set of rules, where r i , . . . , r n ∈ R, a ij ∈ A, and o ij ∈ O. 1 ) → [(a 11 , o 11 ), . . . , (a 1i , o 1i ) ]
priv(r
Example 4. The user-role and permission-role assignments described in Example 1 may be expressed by the following rewrite rules:
Access requests from users can be evaluated by using a rewrite system to grant or deny the request according to the user-role and permission-role assignments that are included in an RBAC policy specification. For that, we may use the following rules, where U, A, O, R, L are variables and the operators member and ∪ are the standard membership test and union operators.
For example, with the assignment shown in Example 4, we have a reduction sequence: access(u 1 , r, o 1 ) → * grant. In the discussion that follows, we will use R RBAC to refer to the rewrite system that contains the set of rules that we have defined in this section.
Properties of the RBAC Policy
The following properties of R RBAC are easy to check and will be used to show that the specification is consistent, correct and complete: Property 6. The rewrite system R RBAC is terminating and confluent.
Proof. To prove termination, we use a modularity result for hierarchical unions (see Section 2 and [19] ). First, observe that the system R RBAC is hierarchical: the rules defining roles, priv and check form the basis of the hierarchy, they are trivially terminating since the right-hand sides of rules are normal forms, and they are non-duplicating because the right-hand sides contain no variables. The rules defining privileges are recursive, but the recursive call is made on a subterm of the left-hand side argument. The rule defining access is not recursive. Therefore, the rules defining privileges and access satisfy the recursive scheme and the full system is terminating. To prove confluence, first note that there are no critical pairs, therefore the system is locally confluent. Termination and local confluence imply confluence, by Newman's Lemma [30] .
Corollary 2. Every term has a unique normal form in R RBAC .
As a consequence of the unicity of normal forms, our specification of the RBAC policy R RBAC is consistent.
Property 7 (Consistency). For any u ∈ U, a ∈ A, o ∈ O: it is not possible to derive, from R RBAC , both grant and deny for a request access(u, a, o).
We can give a characterisation of the normal forms:
Property 8. The normal form of a ground term of the form access(u, a, o) where u ∈ U, a ∈ A and o ∈ O is either grant or deny.
As a consequence, our specification of the access control policy is total.
Property 9 (Totality). Each access request access(u, a, o) from a valid user u to perform a valid action a on the object o is either granted or denied. Proof. Since the specification is consistent and total, it is sufficient to show that access(u, a, o) → * grant if and only if u is assigned the access privilege a on the object o. By inspection of the rewrite rules:
Therefore, the result is grant if and only (a, o) ∈ privileges(roles(u)) if and only if (a, o) ∈ priv(r) for some r ∈ roles(u).
It is important to note that the proofs above do not have to be generated by a security administrator; rather, the proofs demonstrate that an RBAC policy R RBAC satisfies the properties described above. A security administrator can simply base an RBAC policy on the term rewrite system that we have defined and can be sure that the properties of R RBAC hold. It is easy to accommodate a notion of seniority of roles where a role inherits, via a role hierarchy, the privileges of its subordinate roles (as explained in Section 2). For that, we just add rules of the form dsub(r i ) → [r 1 , . . . , r j ] to specify a function dsub : R → List(R), where dsub(r i ) = [r 1 , . . . , r j ] means that r 1 , . . . , r j are direct subordinate roles of r i (hence r i is directly senior to r 1 . . . r n ). Then, we redefine the privileges of a role as its privileges plus the privileges of its direct subordinate roles. We use the functions dp to compute direct privileges (which corresponds to the previously defined priv) and the function privileges defined above:
priv(r) → dp(r) ∪ privileges(dsub(r))
Note that we do not need to change the definition of access (see Section 4.1) to accommodate hierarchies of roles, and we do not need to impose conditions on the form that a role hierarchy takes (apart from an acyclicity condition, which is a natural requirement for RBAC role hierarchies).
There are obvious optimisations that could be made if the hierarchy contains sharing (i.e., we should avoid computing twice the privileges of a role if it appears as a subordinate role of several of a user's roles). For instance, we may want to compute first all the roles of a user, including subordinate ones, and then the privileges of this set of roles. Efficiency considerations will be addressed in future work.
RBAC with constraints and reviews
For RBAC policies beyond RBAC P H2A policies, separation of duties constraints must be supported and it must be possible for security administrators to review policy specifications (beyond simple user-role reviewing). We can implement several administrative checks on an RBAC policy, again as rewrite rules.
Separation of Duties is the property that specifies that roles assigned to a user cannot be mutually exclusive. To ensure that a specification of an RBAC policy satisfies the separation of duties property, we will erase conflicting roles assigned to a user (producing a list of roles without mutually exclusive pairs). This is obtained by evaluation of clean(roles(u)) in a rewrite system containing the rules:
Reviews We can add to the specification R RBAC the rules given below. Then, to check that every user has been assigned a role, an administrator could simply evaluate the term RolesDefined?(u).
RolesDefined?(u) → review(roles(u)) review(nil) → "error: user without a role" review(cons(r, lr)) → "OK"
Related Work
In terms of security applications, we note that the SPI-calculus [1] was developed as an extension of the π-calculus for proving the correctness of authentication protocols. In [3] , the π-calculus is applied to reason about a number of basic access control policies and access mechanisms. However, the work described in [3] does not treat RBAC models and policies as rewrite systems. The work most closely related to ours is Koch et al's proposal [26] . In [26] , RBAC is formalised by using a graph-based approach, with graph transformation rules used for describing the effects of actions as they relate to RBAC notions. This formalisation is used by Koch et al as a basis for proving properties of RBAC specifications, based on the categorical semantics of the graph transformations. Our work addresses similar issues to Koch et al's work but provides a different formulation of RBAC policies, and focuses on operational aspects. We use rewrite rules both as a specification and an implementation of an access control policy. To obtain efficient evaluators for request evaluation, sharing of computations is an important issue; for that, we note that graph-based rewriting may be used to devise efficient evaluation strategies.
In recent years, researchers have developed some sophisticated access control models in which access control requirements may be expressed by using rules that are employed to reason about authorised forms of access (see, for example, [22] , [11] , and [9] ). In these approaches, the requirements that must be satisfied in order to access resources are specified by using rules expressed in (C)LP languages and access request evaluation may be viewed as being performed by rewriting, using, for example, SLG-resolution [33] or constraint solvers [28] . Our term rewriting approach offers similar attractions to the (C)LP approaches. We envisage term rewriting, or more generally, equational specifications, being used as an alternative to (C)LP. Term rewriting offers an algebraic approach to specification, where functional definitions can be easily accommodated. In this paper we have used first-order rewriting system; we could also consider a more restricted framework, for instance, orthogonal rewrite systems (in which case the confluence property is guaranteed). On the other hand, we could also consider more general rewriting frameworks, such as higher-order rewriting systems [25, 29] , to gain expressivity: we could then use higher-order functions in our policy specifications.
